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HOW TO AUDIT A KNOWN FRAUD
by N O R M A N C. GROSMAN

The magnitude of the Equity Funding fraud had not been
seen in the American economy since the days of McKesson
and Robbins in the mid-30's. Actually, to begin the
reorganization of a company with a fraud as pervasive as
this one is beyond the experience of most professionals in
today's business world—be they accountants, attorneys,
trustees, or anyone else.
The fraud continued for at least nine years. All of the
mechanisms of regulation and scrutiny, including annual
audits, did not uncover what was going on. It came to light
because a disgruntled former employee talked to a
securities analyst. How much longer the fraud might have
continued is very problematical. It seemed that it could not
have lasted very much longer, but I suspect that anyone
looking at the situation two to three years before would
have said the same thing.
The case was originally billed as a sophisticated computer
and insurance fraud. Really.it was neither of these. It would
be more accurately characterized as an ordinary securities
fraud. Ordinary in the sense that the motivation was one of
inflation of earnings to provide the basis for increased stock
prices. The purpose of the fraud was to create artificial
values for the stock. The other aspects of it developed
during the later years of its existence.
In talking about Equity Funding as a securities fraud, it is
necessary to understand that the illegal acts started before
the company ever went public in 1964. The wrongdoing, as
best as can be determined, was premeditated. In other
words, it was planned to inflate earnings, to increase the
price of the stock. It is unique of course in the length of time
during which it continued. It is also probably unique in its
pervasiveness. Most other cases seem to have been limited
to a few major transactions, usually involving a limited
number of people. In Equity Funding's case, however,
there was direct involvement of at least 15 people. And the
misrepresentation was not limited to a few transactions but
involved the basic operating accounts of Equity Funding.
From the initiation of the fraud through at least 1969, the
procedure was highly simple, took very little time, and
involved little effort to cover-up. The basic fraud during this
period was achieved through regular accounting e n t r i e s increasing both accounts receivable and commission
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income. It was one accounting entry a month, or one
accounting entry a quarter. There was no computer
involvement at all.
As the fraud developed, it was expanded into the Equity
Funding's insurance operations, through the creation and
reinsurance of fictitious insurance policies. Since this
required significant detailed support, the use of the
computer became important.
But the use of the computer in the Equity Funding
operations was still not extensive compared to its use in
today's business. While certain fictitious information was
maintained on the computer, none of it was inputed on a
regular basis. The information that was added to the
records was done off-line. It did not involve any special
technology, or any unusual programming. It did, however,
require a lower level of controls and less systems
integration than one would ordinarily expect.
Part of the nature of the fraud was that it had to increase
in magnitude in order that the company could show
increased earnings. Thus, increasing amounts of fictitious
income had to be created. The company was in an
extremely tight cash position at the time of the discovery of
the illegal acts, and it undoubtedly had similar problems in
the past as well. This required the continual raising of
additional capital and additional borrowings. How much
longer all this could have continued is unclear,
The fraud got its first major publicity at the end of March,
1973, when an extensive article appeared in the Wall Street
Journal. A day or two after this disclosure, the Touche Ross
office in Los Angeles received a phone call from a law firm
in our city asking us if we would be interested in becoming
the auditors for Equity Funding. We met with the law firm
and with the judge and were appointed as auditors on April
2, The company went into Chapter X reorganization on
April 5, 1973 and we were reappointed as auditors to the
company under the Chapter X proceedings. We were
actually appointed before the trustee. This was an unusual
situation, but it was necessary because of the extent of the
fraud, the publicity that was given to it, and the need for
some work to be done immediately.
When we started our work, senior audit personnel from
the California and Illinois insurance departments were

already at Equity Funding and had begun their investigation. The SEC was also present, as well as the FBI and the U.S.
Post Office.
The major thrust of the investigation as we joined it was in
the insurance area. Very little was known about the fraud in
other parts of the company. Thus, our initial concept was
much the same as the public concept, namely that it was a
large sophisticated computer fraud—and an insurance
fraud. As our work developed it became apparent that not
only were the illegal acts more pervasive, but that the
insurance aspects were a later development, not the initial
thrust. It also became clear that the computer aspects were
not nearly so important as originally portrayed.
From the start, we really had two basic objectives in our
work as auditors. The first was to help establish the current
financial condition of the company; the second was to assist
in the fraud investigation.
To ascertain the financial condition of the company, we
needed to locate the principal fictitious items and identify
what adjustments to the accounts were necessary. This
information did not have to be highly accurate, but it was
necessary to arrive as quickly as possible at a reasonable
picture of the company's financial condition. At the same
time, we started on a more complete determination of the
financial condition of the company as of the date of the
filing of the Chapter X proceedings. In other words, we
commenced an audit of the company's books as of April
5th, the same day as the reorganization filing, and these two
phases were done simultaneously.
The Equity Funding operation covered a wide
geographical area. The firm was headquartered in Century
City, Los Angeles, and a part of the insurance operation and
most of the insurance sales operation were based there.
There were other freestanding insurance companies in the
states of New Jersey and Washington. There was a cattle
operation headquartered in Colorado. There was also a
savings and loan association in Los Angeles. These freestanding subsidiaries and a number of others were
not extensively involved in the fraud, if at all. Of course we
didn't know this when we started our work, and so we had
to approach our audits of these companies as though fraud
might exist. But we adjusted our procedures as it became
apparent that their records and their balances were reliable.
Practical Problems of a Fraud Audit
In performing this work, we started out with probably 10 to
15 people, and soon had as many as 70 people working on
the engagement. The work in connection with the fraud
investigation, the other part of our work, was done over a
period of two years. The major effort in the investigatory

area was done after the completion of our audit, since it was
much more important to determine the current status of
the company than what went on in the past.
There are, of course, significant problems in auditing a
company following an extensive fraud. Most of the senior
financial and management people were no longer with
Equity Funding, for example; many of them had been
involved in the deceit and were immediately dismissed
upon discovery. But because of the pervasiveness of the
illegal acts, we were not able to determine immediately
which of the people who remained were not involved. In
other words, who could be trusted.
Obviously, too, the records were in very poor condition.
Many of them were not complete. We were also not sure if
any records had been destroyed or altered in the last days in
an attempt to conceal the fraud—particularly computer
files. And still other records contained significant errors.
Because the senior financial and management people
had been discharged, we had no one to discuss most of the
transactions with. Normally you have people who can tell
you the background of a transaction—the nature of it, the
details. In this case, there was no one to ask. Many unusual
receivables existed on the books that we could get little
information on. In other areas of fraud, we were able to
reconstruct balances, but we had no one to corroborate the
information that we developed.
The trustworthiness of those in the computer department was one of our critical problems. The regulatory
people were very much concerned that computer files
might be destroyed, which is obviously very easy to do.
Because of this, we had to control from the start all
computer files that had existed on April 5, the date of the
Chapter X proceeding.
Our first step was to duplicate the files as they were
requested, so that we could maintain control of the
computer files at all times. While the company's data
processing people were permitted to continue their
operation, they had to request files from us whenever they
were needed for processing.
However, I think the most significant problem related to
our uncertainty whether we had complete records. As an
example, the receivables arising through the insurance
funding operation had a balance of approximately $108
million on April 5,1973, whereas the detailed computer file
totalled only $43 million. We knew there was extensive
fraud in this area, although we still had no idea of the
magnitude. That is, we didn't know whether the data
processing files which totalled $43 million were the
complete files or not, and it took a significant amount of
additional work to establish that. We learned eventually
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that these were the only valid funding receivables of the
company. There were no others.
Another major problem was related to a significant
number of large and unusual receivables. The company
files and records contained little information on the background of these receivables—how they arose and, more
particularly, if they were collectible. As it developed, a
number of these receivables were fictitious or resulted
from transactions that did not have economic substance.
But because we had no one to discuss these receivables
with, it took a significant effort to determine their nature
and particularly their recoverability.
Still another problem was that there were early indications that certain documents in the company's files—such
as bank advices, security advices, and bank statements—
were counterfeit or fraudulent. We had no idea of their
extent, however, and therefore had to perform extensive
verification of internal documents with outside sources.
Finally, because we didn't know the extent of the fictitious
entries, we had to perform almost 100 per cent verification
and analysis of the accounts for long periods of time,
usually for the full year of 1972.
Another complication, not really a problem, was the
need to coordinate our work with a large number of interested parties, including the insurance departments of
Illinois and California, the SEC, the FBI, the US Post Office,
and the US Attorney, as well as the trustee and his counsel.
Certain of the work was divided up, and it was clear that it
should not be duplicated. As an example, Equity Funding
showed a receivable from a Liechtenstein company of some
$9 million. There was no real information about this transaction in the company's files. The investigation of the status of the company was done by members of the SEC staff. It
was not necessary for us to redo this work.
The Question of Testing
In performing a normal audit, we need to evaluate internal
control to determine the extent to which we can limit our
auditing tests. Where there is extensive fraud, it is obviously logical to assume that the internal control is too
weak to rely on. Otherwise, the fraud could not have taken
place. Therefore, we have to do 100 per cent verification in
order to support the proper balances.
While that is a logical approach, I still do not realty think
it's the practical or correct approach. First of all, 100 per
cent verification assumes that all entities and operations of
the company are involved in the fraud more or less equally.
At Equity Funding, however, and probably in other situations, that was not true. There were many subsidiaries that
were not tainted. Even within operations where the illegal
14

Author Norm Grosman, left, keeps
appointment at Century City in Los Angeles
with Robert Loeffler, trustee of
Equity funding Corporation of America.

acts were extensive, not all operations were involved. In
some segments, records were properly maintained.
My conclusion, therefore, is that the way to approach an
audit of this nature is first of all to determine the precise exlent of the fraud. Until then, do not attempt 100 per cent
verification of the transactions or balances. Second, determine the true need for accuracy of information. Need it be
100 per cent accurate for operating purposes? Must it be so
for reporting purposes, or for the purpose of issuing a
report? There is really no practical way to issue an unqualified audit report in an extensive fraud situation. C o n d i tions are not clear. For operating purposes, however, it may
be adequate to have reasonably accurate information.
In other words, the only way to fully establish a balance
may be 100 per cent verification. But, reasonable accuracy
may well be obtained by significantly reduced testing, and
this would be more than sufficient for the company's continued operation. The audit uncertainty that would arise
could appropriately be covered in the auditor's report.
Therefore, I think the proper approach is to take an initial sampling of transactions. In other words, start out with
less than 100 per cent testing in a certain area. But structure
the testing so that it can be increased in an organized way
after the initial sample is evaluated.
It is also extremely important to maintain communications with all of the investigatory and operating personnel.
Unfortunately, people tend to be concerned only with
their own responsibility. They do not communicate automatically to others, even though we all could benefit from
what is learned by other parties.
For example, at the insurance subsidiary headquartered
in Century City, approximately two-thirds of the purported insurance in-force did not exist. The company had
created large numbers of fictitious insurance policies, and
then reinsured them with other insurance companies, in
this situation, the insurance in-force file contained details
on the fictitious policies as well as the valid ones. W h e n we
started our work we knew that a large percentage of the
policies purportedly in-force were not valid, but we did not
know which ones they were.
T o identify which of the policies in the files were valid, so
that regular operations could proceed, the fictitious
policies were labeled with special department numbers or
billing codes. The state insurance department personnel
and company computer people split the in-force file
15
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nary split was substantially accurate. In retrospect, it might
seem 100 per cent verification was unnecessary, but we
didn't know when we started just how accurate was that
preliminary split based upon department numbers and
billing codes. O u r decision for the 100 per cent verification
was based as much upon the company's operating need for
an accurate listing of policies in-force as it was for our audit
purposes.
There was another related area in which we did not
perform 100 per cent verification. The in-force file contains
information about the policy holder necessary to calculate
reserves; such as the extent of coverage, the age of the
insured, sex, any physical impairment which would require
additional reserves. We felt that this file would not require
100 per cent confirmation because, while the in-force file
contained a significant number of fictitious policies, we had
no indication that other information which would be used
to calculate the reserve was inaccurate. O f course, if the
sample tests indicated that the information was inaccurate,
we could always expand our confirmation.
Donald Ingberg, vice president and controller
of Equity Funding of America, confers with
Los Angeles audit manager Janice Buswell.
between valid policies and policies based on information
provided by former employees who had been involved in
the fraud.
The accuracy of the split was not clear, however. The
credibility of the people providing the information was suspect. The accuracy with which the computer files were
regularly maintained was not clear. Also, there was some
indication that in the last days of the fraud, when discovery
was imminent, the billing codes and department numbers
might have been changed in an attempt to conceal the full
extent of the fraud. Because of these reasons, the split
needed verification. We concluded that the only valid way
to do this would be a 100 per cent confirmation of the inforce file.
This involved extensive computer programming to
update the files. It took probably a month's planning to
program the confirmation procedure and to prepare the
confirmations. The follow-up and other work took two or
three months. W e used a STRATA developed computer
program, but even so we used about eight people in this
confirmation process.
A 100 per cent verification was necessary because the
company needed to know which policies to bill premiums
to, and which policies were valid if a death claim were filed.
The results of the confirmation indicated that the prelimi16

In normal audits, we confirm relatively limited numbers
of balances and transactions. Problems of non-response,
although significant, don't present important problems. In
the Equity Funding situation, however, problems arose in
areas that do not exist in regular audits. For example, in
regular audits you don't have to obtain information from
outsiders in order to determine a balance. Y o u go to the
outsider in order to verify a balance which you presume to
be correct. In Equity Funding, we had to go to outsiders for
the basic information needed to reconstruct the balance.
O n e surprise to me was that we did not get a significantly
higher level of response than we would have received in a
normal audit. This became immediately clear in the confirmation of the insurance in-force. Despite all the publicity attendant to the Equity Funding fraud, many people
who held valid policies did not answer our confirmation
requests. I thought they would be concerned that their
policy was properly maintained in the company's records,
but that presumption was not correct. We did get a higher
level of response than normal, but nowhere near the 100
per cent level. Many people with valid policies simply did
not answer our request for confirmation.
As I previously mentioned, we had to support the
authenticity of a substantial number of external documents that were maintained in the company's files—
because we didn't know whether they were authentic or
not. The first impulse was to say that no document in the
company's files could be relied upon. Therefore to the
extent that the document was an important document, its
authenticity would have to be verified with third parties.

Nelson Gibbs, Los Angeles partner, left,
checks audit figures with senior Jim Johnson
at Equity Funding offices.
But that, we soon learned, was not practical. Most third
parties are not willing to cooperate in any extensive
confirmation process. When this became evident, we carefully screened those documents we wanted authenticated.
Even so, it took a number of months for banks to answer us,
and other parties were less cooperative.
Many of the third parties had become adversaries during
the proceeding. Others were afraid of being sued. And
some just did not want to be implicated in any way with
Equity Funding.
Of course we had no way to force cooperation. W e could
have gone to one of the regulatory groups and requested
subpoenas, but that would not have provided the timely
cooperation we really needed.
There was also a need to discuss the substance of transactions with third parties. Indeed, the best source of information on the nature of a transaction would be the other
side. But, our ability to obtain meaningful information was
almost nonexistent.
In normal audits, we are used to dealing with a final set of
balances. Uncertainties, if any, are limited and clearly
defined. In Equity Funding, however, if we chose to wait
until that point was reached, we still would not have issued
our report. As a result, we balanced the number of unresolved items with the need for getting out a public document that had basically accurate information.
That is why we completed our audit and issued our report
with a substantial number of uncertainties left unresolved—far more than one would clearly expect in normal
audits. O n e of the principal areas of uncertainty was in
creditor claims. The attorneys and company personnel had
started to screen and evaluate such claims only a month or
so before our report had to be issued. W h e n we issued the
report, we indicated that the claims had not yet been evaluated, nor had their effect been determined. O u r conclusion was that while this was an important area, even if the
claims had been fully analyzed, there would be no way of
knowing the ultimate allowance of claims for as long as a
year and a half. So we completed our work and issued our
audit in early February, 1974.
The Fraud I n v e s t i g a t i o n

Concerning the fraud investigation, there are some obvious points to make. Probably we all realize them. First of
all, we didn't do this investigation alone. I have already
referred to the FBI, SEC, the US Attorney, the trustee's
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attorneys, and the state insurance departments. We were all
really part of the team and we each had our strengths and
weaknesses.
I think it's also obvious that the training and experience
of a C P A doesn't help him very much when doing work of
an investigative nature. We have limited experience in
questioning people and recording the results of that interrogation. Lawyers are trained to do this all the time.
M u c h of the fraud investigation goes beyond the mere
analysis of numbers and records. It involves taking statements—actually testimony—from a large number of
people w h o were involved or had dealings with the company. This really is not our strong point. What we do best is
to understand the financial import of what we see, relating
information to the total framework of the company's financial position. We can evaluate the known areas of the fraud
and its effects on the company's operation much better
than can any of the other parlies. We can also provide
analyses and summaries of transactions in a much better
way than they can. We are always doing these things. C o n centrating our efforts where we have such experience is the
best way, 1 think, to coordinate our work with that being
done by the other members of the investigatory team.
Another important point is that documentation in this
area is different from what we normally consider adequate
documentation. O u r long experience in documenting
audit work is not necessarily adequate in a legal or evidentiary sense. So when we start to develop information, it is
very important that we spend time with the lawyers to make
sure that we will obtain sufficient detail and sufficient
support for it to be used as evidence later.
Roundup and Conclusions
Touche Ross issued a report on the audit of Equity
Funding's balance sheet in February, 1974. This ended our
major man-hour effort. Since then, we have frequently
assisted in the investigatory aspects. The trustee issued a
report on the fraud at the end of October, 1974. We participated in the preparation of the report and provided much
of the basic financial information in the report. Since then
we have assisted the trustee in developing the accounting
basis for the reorganized entity, and in developing information and preparing the documents filed during the reorganization process. We have also worked with a large
number of lawyers who are handling criminal and civil
litigation arising out of the fraud. In fact, the civil litigation
will continue after the reorganization. Frankly, the work
done after the issuance of our audit report in February,
1974, has been far more varied, far more interesting than
was the basic audit work done during 1973.
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Probably the most difficult part of the audit work in 1973
was pulling together quickly the number of people necessary to do the work, and then managing a group of that size.
In retrospect, the auditing and reporting problems seem
less than the management problems of the audit.
Recent work has seemed more interesting because the
people-management problem has disappeared and because knowledge of the situation and the facts has become
clearer. The passage of time alone has firmed up many of
the things that we were uncertain about. Also, the viability
of the reorganization plan has become clear. A n d certainly
satisfaction with the work we are doing is greater when it is
evident that the company will survive.
What were the major auditing lessons learned as a result
of this experience at Equity Funding? Three stand out: O n e ,
establish the auditor's role and the role of others as early as
possible, so that each can benefit from the other's information and not duplicate each other's work. Two, top priority must be given to the continued operation of the business. Traditional auditing and preparation of reports is not
nearly so important as is obtaining valid and accurate information that will enable the business to operate. If all the
auditor does is to provide an audit of a financial statement,
he hasn't best served the reorganization of the company.
And three, do not be limited by traditional audit approaches, which depend on an evaluation of the reliability
of records and controls. In a fraud, such controls and
validity do not exist in all the company's operations.
What is the status of Equity Funding today?
A plan of reorganization has been approved by all major
stockholder credit groups, by the SEC, and by the court.
The plan provides for continuing the operations of the
insurance companies in New Jersey and Washington which
were not involved in the fraud. The reorganization of
Equity Funding was completed this spring. The operations
will be transferred to the new reorganized entity, which will
have an estimated net worth of $80-$90 million. The
companies are viable and are presently profitable.
£
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